Losers and Losers: Some Demographics of Medical Malpractice Tort Reforms by Friedson, Andrew & Kniesner, Thomas J
Syracuse University 
SURFACE 
Economics - Faculty Scholarship Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs 
9-2011 
Losers and Losers: Some Demographics of Medical Malpractice 
Tort Reforms 
Andrew Friedson 
Thomas J. Kniesner 
Syracuse University and Institute for the Study of Labor 
Follow this and additional works at: https://surface.syr.edu/ecn 
 Part of the Economics Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Friedson, Andrew and Kniesner, Thomas J., "Losers and Losers: Some Demographics of Medical 
Malpractice Tort Reforms" (2011). Economics - Faculty Scholarship. 115. 
https://surface.syr.edu/ecn/115 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at 
SURFACE. It has been accepted for inclusion in Economics - Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of 
SURFACE. For more information, please contact surface@syr.edu. 
D
I
S
C
U
S
S
I
O
N
 
P
A
P
E
R
 
S
E
R
I
E
S
Forschungsinstitut 
zur Zukunft der Arbeit
Institute for the Study 
of Labor 
Losers and Losers: Some Demographics of 
Medical Malpractice Tort Reforms
IZA DP No. 5921
August 2011
Andrew I. Friedson
Thomas J. Kniesner
 
Losers and Losers: 
Some Demographics of 
Medical Malpractice Tort Reforms 
 
 
Andrew I. Friedson 
Syracuse University  
 
Thomas J. Kniesner 
Syracuse University 
and IZA 
 
 
 
 
 
Discussion Paper No. 5921 
August 2011 
 
 
 
IZA 
 
P.O. Box 7240   
53072 Bonn   
Germany   
 
Phone: +49-228-3894-0  
Fax: +49-228-3894-180   
E-mail: iza@iza.org
 
 
 
 
 
Any opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of IZA. Research published in 
this series may include views on policy, but the institute itself takes no institutional policy positions. 
 
The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center 
and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit 
organization supported by Deutsche Post Foundation. The center is associated with the University of 
Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its international network, workshops and 
conferences, data service, project support, research visits and doctoral program. IZA engages in (i) 
original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of 
policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public.  
 
IZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. 
Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be 
available directly from the author. 
IZA Discussion Paper No. 5921 
August 2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Losers and Losers: 
Some Demographics of Medical Malpractice Tort Reforms 
 
Our research examines individual differences in the effects of medical malpractice tort 
reforms on pre-trial settlement speed and settlement amounts by age and most likely 
settlement size. Findings of note include that, unlike previously assumed, both absolute and 
percentage losses from tort reform are small for infants in an asset value sense and that the 
prime-aged working population is the group most negatively affected by tort reform. 
Maximum entropy quantile regressions highlight the robustness of our conclusions and reveal 
that the settlement losses most informative for policy evaluation differ greatly from mean 
regression estimates. 
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 The medical malpractice tort system in the United States has several purposes. 
Most noted is the goal of incenting doctors to practice so-called appropriate medicine 
through the negligence rule of liability. The negligence aspect of the malpractice system 
has been widely studied for its implications on physician behavior, particularly the 
practice of defensive medicine (Kessler and McClellan 1996, Kim 2007) or physician 
work choices (Kessler, Sage, and Becker 2005; Matsa 2007). Another purpose of the 
malpractice tort system is to compensate injured patients. The compensation is intended 
to offset economic damages from lost wages and the psychic costs of pain and suffering. 
The medical malpractice tort system therefore provides implicit insurance against adverse 
outcomes among patients when they consume medical services. Here we examine an 
under-appreciated dimension of the insurance aspect of the medical malpractice tort 
system, which is how tort reforms have affected interpersonal differences in patients’ 
implicit insurance.1
 In particular, we use closed claims from the state of Texas to examine 
econometrically how a reform package impacts people seeking recompense under their 
implicit insurance – people who have been negligently injured and are trying to get quick 
compensation. The particular reform package of interest was part of the Texas 2003 HB 4 
law, which introduced two changes to the Texas malpractice liability system: (1) a cap on 
non-economic damages and (2) an early offer system. 
 
The most widespread policy reform of medical malpractice has been a cap on 
non-economic damages. Caps have been implemented in about half the states and their 
effects widely studied in terms of their total cost implications for the medical care system 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 A parallel line of research examines differences in damage cap effects across insurance 
providers (Viscusi and Born 2005). 
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(Danzon 1985, Donohue and Ho 2007, Lakdawalla and Seabury 2009, and Mello et al. 
2010 to name a few). Damage caps put a maximum on how much can be paid out and, as 
such, lower the likelihood of a so-called blockbuster case.2
Early offer schemes create incentives for plaintiffs and defendants to settle early 
and punish them for passing up so-called good deals. In Texas, if it can be shown after 
the case that the party in question would have been better off accepting the offer the early 
offer scheme forces the side that turned down the early offer to pay the other side’s legal 
fees. Not only do early offer reforms save considerable time in the litigation process 
(Hersch, O’Connell, and Viscusi 2007) but they also lower the payouts in malpractice 
litigation (Black, Hyman, and Silver 2009). 
 Because caps reduce the 
variance between the plaintiff’s and defendant’s expected values of the case they have the 
dual consequences of a lower average payout per case plus a shorter length of time to 
settlement (Abraham 2001, Avraham 2007).  
 The components of the Texas reforms, damage caps and early offer schemes, have 
similar effects on the insurance that is implicit in the medical malpractice liability system. 
The implicit insurance claims have smaller, quicker payouts after the reforms. Whether or 
not the reforms improve the economic well-being of the holder of the policy depends on 
two factors. The first is the cost of the insurance paid implicitly through changes in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Although not a perfect match, damage caps parallel bankruptcy law. One has an asset 
with uncertain value (the right to sue here/the right to declare bankruptcy). It could be 
worth zero (you lose the case/cannot declare for legal reasons or benefits could be totally 
offset by a lowered credit score). It could also be worth a lot (you win the case/you are 
able to declare bankruptcy and protect your assets). The outcome is ambiguous as risk 
abounds (juries/uncertainty as to the law or how severely your credit score will be 
affected). In both tort cases and bankruptcy there is an intermediate way out (settlement/ 
debt restructuring that is less protection of assets or less of a disruption to one’s credit 
score). 
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patients’ costs of medical services. Evidence is far from plentiful, but research suggests 
that physicians respond to changes in malpractice liability mainly via services quantities 
and not prices (Danzon 1990, Lakdawalla and Seabury 2009, Kessler 2011). Second, the 
ultimate welfare effect of the reforms depends on the change in the value of a settlement, 
which involves both the size of the settlement and the time it takes to reach the 
settlement, and is the focal point of our empirical research. 
 Specifically, we look at how the value of a settlement changes across different age 
demographics after the reform was enacted. The change in settlement value comes from 
three channels: a direct effect of the reform lowering the amount of the average 
settlement, an indirect effect of the reform lowering the average amount that a claimant 
asks for, and a timing effect of the reform speeding up the time until settlement. We find 
that claimants in their prime working years suffer the largest economic loss in settlement 
value. The age pattern is true for the mean, median and maximum entropy quantile of 
settlement amounts across age groups although the most informative location in the 
distribution is most often the median. Our results differ from the common belief that 
medical malpractice reforms have the largest negative impact on the settlements of the 
very young and the elderly.3
2. Theoretical Considerations 
 
To understand the fundamental economics of the decision to settle and why there 
may be age and other interpersonal differences in malpractice insurance damage caps’ 
effects consider two actors  and B. Here both have been negligently injured and now 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Medical malpractice damage caps supposedly reduce settlements for the young and the 
elderly most because they do not have large earnings and, as such, do not have large 
economic damages to claim (Finley 2004; Rubin and Shepherd 2008). 
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have the right to sue. The right to sue is a risky asset  that takes on two values. An actor 
can go to court and will win with probability	   , in which case  takes on the value	   >
0, or may lose with probability 1 , in which case  takes on the value zero. For 
simplicity, assume that = 1 = 	  0.5, although the implications of the theoretical 
exercise that follows does not depend on the assumption of a 50-50 chance of winning 
the case. 
A and B have different risk preferences: A is risk neutral and B is risk averse. 
More formally, the actors have respective utility functions ( ) and ( ) such that  
( ) , ( ) > 0 and	   ( ) = 0, ( ) < 0. We also assume that (0) =
(0) = 0 and that the utility functions do not cross. This gives the two utility functions 
shown in Figure 1. 
Let	   [ ] = . Each actor receives utility from the asset,  person A 
receives	   ( ) = [ ( )], which can be seen in Figure 1 by tracing up from  to 
( ) and over to the vertical axis. B receives expected utility	   [ ( )], which can be 
seen in Figure 1 by tracing up from  to the ray connecting the origin to ( ) and 
over to the vertical axis. Both actors are indifferent between going to court and a 
settlement that gives them their expected utility of the risky asset, and will settle for that 
amount or any greater amount. Person B is willing to accept a settlement of less than  
due to risk aversion.4
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 The more risk averse actor accepting a smaller settlement appears in a more general 
case of two risk averse bargainers who will go to an uncertain arbitrator if they cannot 
reach a settlement by Crawford (1984). In Crawford’s model, an increase of an actor’s 
risk aversion leads to a decrease in their settlement all else equal. 
 There will then be age differences in settlement willingness to the 
extent that risk aversion varies by age (Halek and Eisenhauer 2001, Anderson et al. 
2008). 
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Now consider a cap on the amount that can be recovered in damages in a court 
award. This will change the maximum amount of the risky asset. The new asset  can 
now either take on the value zero or  with equal probability. Let	   [ ] = . We can 
find each actor’s utility from the new asset in a similar fashion as before. Person A 
receives	   ( ) = [ ( )], which can be seen in Figure 1 by tracing up from  to 
( ) and over to the vertical axis; B receives expected utility	   [ ( )], which can be 
seen in Figure 1 by tracing up from  to the ray connecting the origin to ( ) and 
over to the vertical axis. 
If we take the difference between the utility from the original asset	   , and the 
capped asset	    we get  for actor A, and  for actor B. It is immediately noticeable 
that	   > , or that the less risk averse actor has a larger reduction in utility from the 
implementation of a cap on damages. The implication is that risk aversion differences by 
age or predicted settlement size can lead to age and other differences in the welfare loss 
from damage caps. 
There are a few remarks that should be made about the above theoretical exercise. 
The first is that the behavioral implications do not depend on one of the actors being risk 
neutral. If actor A is also risk averse the result that the less risk averse party suffers a 
larger utility loss is maintained as long as the other assumptions are still met. It is also 
important to note that actors’ changes in minimum acceptable settlements do not follow 
as clean a rule as their changes in utility. A careful inspection of Figure 1 may make it 
look as if there is a clear association between changes in minimum acceptable settlement 
and the relative risk aversion of the actors, but that is an artifice of A being risk neutral. 
Any systematic effects of possible interpersonal differences in relative risk aversion and 
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their attendant implications for how damage caps affect the size (asset value) of the 
settlement needs to be discovered empirically. 
3. Data 
The data we use to estimate the distributional consequences of malpractice 
reforms come from the Texas Department of Insurance Closed Claims Database (CCD), 
which include every insurance claim over $10,000 closed in Texas during 1988-2007. 
The data include indications of the type of insurance and the party purchasing the 
insurance so that one can identify cases that deal specifically with medical malpractice. 
The subset of the data we use includes 21,733 claims on medical malpractice insurance 
policies of health care providers including physicians, dentists, hospitals, and nursing 
homes. 
 Each of our data points is a closed claim. Although there are data for 2007, there 
can be cases originating prior to 2007 that closed after 2007 and so are not represented. 
Each claim provides information on the time, location, and type of injury (the closed 
claims report uses broad definitions such as brain damage or back injury rather than 
diagnosis codes). For the injured party the data include age, employment status, and 
availability of compensation other than torts. The CCD also has comprehensive 
information concerning any and all legal action that took place including all settlement 
amounts and jury awards. Finally there is limited information on the defendants, 
including the type of entity plus information about the payout limits associated with its 
policies, and the estimates of litigation and indemnity costs by its insurance providers. 
 To ensure that we are not looking at people who are deliberately holding out for a 
try at a so-called blockbuster jury award we limit our sample to cases settled in three 
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years or less (the average length of a case that reaches a verdict is 5.5 years).5
The main outcomes we examine are (1) the total amount of a settlement 
conditional on settlement before a verdict, (2) the amount of compensation demanded by 
the claimant conditional on settlement before a verdict, and (3) the time until settlement. 
Because it is a claims database, the CCD contains plentiful information on the relevant 
insurer and its behavior during the claims process. Of much importance is the indemnity 
reserve, which is the amount of money that the insurance company has set aside to pay 
for damages. The indemnity reserve is the insurance company’s best estimate of the risk 
associated with a possible jury award or settlement, and effectively controls for many 
characteristics of the injury. Last, the claims database that we use also contains 
information on the specific policies’ per accident maximum payout limits. 
 The result 
is a sample of 6,130 observations. Figure 2 shows the density of claims by year for both 
settled claims and claims that go to verdict. By limiting our sample to three years we 
exclude most cases that would have been settled close to verdict. 
 Table 1 contains the summary statistics for the data we use in the econometric 
estimation to follow. The first row documents the substantial reduction (about 55 percent) 
in the settlement amount after the reform, the second row documents a similar (50 
percent) reduction in cash demanded, and the third row documents the notable reduction 
(33-45 percent) in case duration. There is clear evidence that the Texas reforms affected 
the ceiling of damages and encouraged quicker settlements on average. Our subsequent 
econometric models clarify the distributional consequences and the channels at work in 
the tort reforms producing the outcomes summarized in Table 1. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Later we examine the robustness of our results to the length of the settlement window. 
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4. Empirical Methods and Results 
 Estimating the component effects of the tort reform can be done with a multi-step 
procedure. First we estimate the amount that average settlement compensation decreased 
directly. Next we estimate the indirect effect in settlement amount via changes in cash 
demanded. Finally, we estimate the reduction in time to settlement after the reform. In all 
cases we consider distributional issues such as heterogeneity by age, settlement amounts 
or time to settlement. 
4.1 Settlement Amounts and Initial Cash Demanded 
To begin to separate the direct and indirect effects of tort reform from other 
variables that are also related to the size and speed of compensation, we estimate two 
multivariate OLS regressions: 
(1) Yit	  =	   01	  +	   11X1it	  +	   1Cit	  +	   1Rt	  	  and	  
(2) Cit	  =	   02	  +	   12	  X2it	  +	   2Rt. 
Here Y is a claim settlement amount, X is a vector of time varying control variables 
whose effect we wish to remove from our estimate of the effect of the reform, C is initial 
cash demanded, and R is an indicator variable equal to one in the time period after the 
reform has been enacted, and zero otherwise. Thus, k (k = 1, 2) is the estimated effect of 
the reform on either the amount of the settlement or the amount initially demanded by the 
claimant.  
 The OLS results in Table 2 illustrate the post-reform settlement amount holding 
constant other factors, including cash demanded, which we view as an indicator of an 
initial signal of how likely the claimant is willing to settle. The results for the all ages 
regression reported in the last column indicate a $59,000 reduction in the settlement 
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amount post-reform, which is about 13 percent of the pre-reform mean. The 
disaggregated results show that the groups most affected by the reform are people in the 
20s and 30s, and that the reform is clearly non-neutral by age. 
A final result of note in Table 2 is that for all the age groups there is a significant 
effect of initial cash demanded on settlements, with the largest impact on babies, where 
settlements rise by about $0.74 for every $1 of cash demanded initially. The consequence 
is that one also need examine the effect of damage caps on the initial demands which, as 
noted, may indicate bargaining rigidity of the claimant. 
There is a substantial change in the post-reform period in initial cash demanded. 
For the pooled (N = 6,130) regression in Table 3 there is about a 40 percent reduction in 
initial cash demanded. So, when paired with the results of Table 2, the percentage total 
effect of the reform, 100( 1 + 1 2)/ Y(pre-reform), is to reduce settlements by an average of 
about 38 percent of the pre-reform average settlement, or by a total of $177,000. Once 
again the results are heterogeneous by age, so that the largest dollar effects in Table 3 are 
in the prime working years. This may indicate that working age people care about getting 
back to work quickly compared to those close to retirement who may be more willing to 
endure a protracted settlement period.  
4.2 Time to Settlement 
 To examine the issue of how the reform affected time to payment we also 
estimated Cox (1972) proportional hazard models 
 (3)	  	   hi(t)	  =	  h0(t)exp( 13Xit	  +	   3Cit	  +	   3Rt),	  	  
with standard errors calculated using the robust method in Lin and Wei (1979). Here the 
antilog of the coefficient of the reform dummy implies the hazard ratios in Table 4, which 
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are revealed in the survival functions illustrated in Figure 3. Note, for example, that pre-
reform virtually no case had settled by the 500 day mark, while post-reform about one-
third had settled. Similarly, it took about 50 percent longer for half the cases to have 
settled pre reform versus post reform.  
 From the estimated hazard ratios in Table 4 we see that, on average, people settle 
about 50 percent faster with the largest effect ( 60 percent) on cases involving infants. 
Again there is substantial heterogeneity in the estimated effect of the reform on time until 
settlement, as cases involving the elderly are settled 40 percent more quickly. Finally, we 
note that, unlike the level of settlements, time to settlement is not affected by initial cash 
demanded so that there is no influence of the policy reform on time to settlement via a 
moderation of cash demanded channel.  
4.3 Effect of the Reform on the Economic Value of Settlements 
 Using the procedure described in the Appendix we display in Table 5 the 
economic effects of the reform in terms of its impact on the asset value of a malpractice 
settlement. Table 5 breaks the effect of the policy out by channels, the direct effect on the 
settlement amount, the indirect effect via decreased cash demands, and then the change in 
timing from speedier settlements. 
For all ages, while speeding up the time to payment by about 420 days, the effect 
of reform on settlements is to reduce the present value by 36 percent.6
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Present value calculations use the average of the real interest rate on a 3-month T-bill 
over the time period of our sample. 
 Once again there is 
substantial heterogeneity by age. Persons in their 30s demand about $175,000 less and 
then have an average settlement that is about $103,000 lower that is paid only about 421 
days (50 percent) faster so that the implicit asset value of the settlement is about 60 
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percent ($276,000) lower. The tort reforms are not welfare improving in a basic 
economic sense. One possible explanation for the heterogeneity by age is that claimants 
in their prime working age have a different level of relative risk aversion than those with 
injured children or the elderly. It is also possible that working age claimants settle for less 
in an attempt to expedite the settlement process and return to work as quickly as possible. 
4.4 Additional Dimensions of the Distributional Consequences of the Reform 
 There is much research demonstrating the usefulness of quantile regression in 
examining the distributional consequences of economic interventions in the labor market 
(Kniesner, Viscusi, and Ziliak 2010) and in the case of medical malpractice insurance 
(Viscusi and Born 2005). The standard quantile regression model has an expression for 
the fitted residual that in our case is 
(4)  = + +  or 
(5)  = + . 
Next there is a multiplier  where 
(6) 	   = 2 ,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	   > 02(1 ), 	    
with q the quantile of interest. The quantile regression is then 
(7)  	   | | , 
which is solved via linear programming (Armstrong, et al. 1975). 
Recent research adds a parameter ( ) that, when minimized in conjunction with (4)-(7), 
reveals the most probable or maximum entropy quantile (Golan 2006, Bera et al. 2010).7
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 One can also intuit  as a penalty for deviating from the median as the most likely 
quantile. 
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In terms of policy interventions one should be particularly interested in the most likely 
effect size, which comes from the most likely quantile. 
 Table 6 presents the estimated maximum entropy quantile for the various age 
groups. The point of the exercise is to reveal more of the policy heterogeneity. Note that 
the estimated maximum entropy quantile is lower for older people. Although it is close to 
the median for ages 50-69, in no other age group is the median outcome the place in the 
fitted settlement distribution that is most likely. 
 There is substantial heterogeneity in the impact of the reform across conditional 
quantiles of cash demanded and settlement amounts. The differing effects of the policy 
are presented in Figure 4 for conditional quantiles of settlement amount and in Figure 5 
for conditional quantiles of cash demanded. For the pooled sample the negative effect of 
the policy on settlement amounts peaks at the 30th conditional quantile and then drops off 
at the quantiles increase. For cash demanded the effect of the policy is monotonically 
increasing in magnitude with the conditional quantile. Because of the differing effects, if 
a part of the distribution other than the mean is most likely, then using the estimated 
policy effect at the maximum entropy quantile will make a sizable difference in the 
estimated value of the settlement. 
 The heterogeneity in policy effects and the difference it makes in focusing on the 
most likely place in the distribution of potential outcomes are highlighted in Table 7. 
There we compare estimated mean, median, and maximum entropy quantile malpractice 
reform effects on asset value lost. Note that for people in their 30s the most likely effect 
is less than half the mean effect. Alternatively, the most likely effect is much larger ( 28 
percent) than the mean effect (0) in the case of young people 3-19. It is also the case that 
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(1) there is little heterogeneity in effect by age group for the vast majority of the groups 
and (2) the most likely quantile estimates are often fairly similar to the estimates one 
would get from a median regression. When estimating medical malpractice reform 
effects, a simple least absolute deviation regression, which trims the outliers, is an 
important improvement over OLS. 
The conclusion again emerging from maximum entropy quantile regressions is 
that on pure economic asset returns grounds the policy is welfare reducing. Claimants 
would have benefitted economically from a slower larger settlement typical of the pre-
reform period. Unlike what has been inferred previously (Finley 2004; Rubin and 
Shepherd 2008), the results in Table 7 show that infants and the elderly are not the 
hardest hit. In addition to infants having the smallest expected effects from damage caps 
the largest percentage asset loss is among people in their 50s. 
4.5 Robustness Check    
The final econometric issue we confront is whether our results are sensitive to 
small changes in the assumed settlement period window of three years. Table 8 presents 
settlement results for a 3.5 year time frame compared to a 3 year window, which enlarges 
the sample size by 50 percent. Note the similarity of results of interest, the estimated 
values of  and , with those in Table 2.8
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Results not tabulated are similar for settlement windows of 3.25 or 3.75 years.  
 Table 9 repeats the robustness checking exercise 
for the dependent variable of cash demanded by the claimant. Again, the results are 
similar to those found in the three year window. 
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5. Conclusion 
 Because of its many perceived benefits state legislatures have found tort reform 
attractive. Reforms such as damage caps and early offer systems speed up cases and help 
reduce caseloads in the courts. They also lower the size of claims, which possibly 
decreases so-called wasteful defensive medicine and decreases the related stress costs on 
physicians. Another touted benefit of tort reforms are that they cut down on claims that 
lack merit and help prevent blockbuster jury awards that are perceived to increase the 
overall cost of health care. The benefits we have mentioned are not without a downside. 
Our evidence is that although injured parties who may desire quicker payment are 
compensated more quickly after the reforms, the cost of doing so is large. It may 
certainly be the case that given the choice specified in clear economic terms claimants, 
particularly those of prime working ages, would have preferred the pre-reform medical 
malpractice tort system. 
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Variable Name Before Reform After Reform Before Reform After Reform
Settlement Amount (Thousands) 471.64 212.79 420.33 228.63
(1,152.18) (577.29) (958.01) (530.99)
Cash Demanded (Thousands) 530.05 249.74 516.69 259.07
(1,310.77) (756.15) (1,322.53) (703.95)
Duration of Case (Days) 837.81 632.96 1,597.17 896.61
(188.78) (257.39) (897.89) (618.44)
Initial Indemnity Reserve (Thousands) 91.37 74.89 79.19 81.69
(151.64) (134.13) (160.45) (135.21)
Per Accident Policy Limit (Thousands) 1,223.17 1,602.66 999.16 1,390.35
(2,101.66) (2,087.11) (2,241.30) (1,989.05)
Age of Injured Party (Years) 42.62 41.02 38.09 41.17
(24.85) (26.61) (25.27) (26.12)
Injured Party was a Baby (Binary) 0.11 0.17 0.17 0.16
(0.32) (0.37) (0.38) (0.37)
Other Physicians Defending (Binary) 0.63 0.27 0.76 0.33
(1.07) (0.72) (1.32) (0.77)
Other Health Care Providers Defending (Binary) 0.27 0.13 0.37 0.16
(0.91) (0.51) (1.56) (0.58)
Observations 4,358 1,772 17,660 2,702
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Settled Within 3 Years Universe of Settled Claims
Note: All dollar values are scaled to year 2000 dollars
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Age Group 0 to 2 3 to 19 20 to 29 30 to 39 40 to 49 50 to 59 60 to 69 All Ages
After Policy Change (Binary) -105.68 -4.95 -111.11 *** -103.40 *** -47.59 -25.00 -23.16 -59.10 ***
(69.63) (63.84) (40.19) (35.54) (39.92) (18.20) (31.77) (16.15)
Cash Demanded (Thousands) 0.74 *** 0.47 *** 0.38 *** 0.56 *** 0.61 *** 0.55 *** 0.64 *** 0.61 ***
(0.09) (0.07) (0.09) (0.14) (0.15) (0.10) (0.16) (0.06)
Initial Indemnity Reserve (Thousands) 0.46 0.29 0.60 *** 0.61 ** 0.84 ** 0.24 0.41 ** 0.46 ***
(0.32) (0.19) (0.16) (0.29) (0.41) (0.16) (0.18) (0.12)
Per Accident Policy Limit (Thousands) 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.04 0.00 -0.01 0.01
(0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Other Physicians Defending (Binary) 87.03 * 99.57 ** 147.49 *** 35.14 108.11 *** 76.17 *** 18.63 72.85 ***
(49.68) (43.46) (53.48) (31.59) (33.25) (19.04) (21.55) (13.87)
Other Health Care Providers Defending (Binary) 150.56 57.72 -4.48 103.25 ** -42.00 125.59 ** 35.08 39.21 **
(110.26) (48.23) (10.69) (50.77) (37.70) (52.24) (23.87) (16.93)
Constant 143.63 ** 60.86 98.84 *** 34.58 -43.35 43.99 ** 31.92 175.75 ***
(71.57) (98.45) (29.17) (30.85) (71.07) (17.93) (54.54) (42.88)
Age (5.63) ***
(1.53)
Age Squared 0.04 ***
(0.01)
Observations 840 373 598 939 871 852 691 6,130
R-squared 0.470 0.647 0.377 0.640 0.660 0.823 0.696 0.575
Note: * denotes P < 0.1, **  denotes P < 0.5, ** denotes P < 0.01, effect of binary variables and constant reported in thousands, robust standard errors in parenthesis
Table 2: OLS Regression Results - Settlment Amount for Cases Settled Within 3 Years (Thousands)
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Age Group 0 to 2 3 to 19 20 to 29 30 to 39 40 to 49 50 to 59 60 to 69 All Ages
After Policy Change (Binary) -195.69 ** -138.65 35.44 -312.90 *** -341.75 *** -119.37 ** -205.40 *** -193.82 ***
(85.52) (168.80) (114.81) 65.40 (152.61) (45.94) (36.41) (27.29)
Initial Indemnity Reserve (Thousands) 2.70 *** 1.59 1.27 *** 2.19 *** 2.58 ** 0.78 * 1.70 * 1.97 ***
(0.73) (0.96) (0.30) 0.75 (1.00) (0.44) (0.98) (0.34)
Per Accident Policy Limit (Thousands) 0.20 *** 0.04 -0.01 0.07 ** 0.09 0.01 0.01 0.04 **
(0.08) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.07) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Other Physicians Defending (Binary) 87.42 223.61 ** 187.75 *** 159.07 ** 227.33 *** 188.13 *** 93.46 *** 162.49 ***
(53.55) (99.83) (498.34) (69.99) (68.18) (45.13) (33.12) (20.78)
Other Health Care Providers Defending (Binary) 293.74 *** -22.54 13.39 49.14 -22.17 505.83 *** -34.71 113.07 **
(111.73) (91.88) (21.29) (67.38) (68.51) (156.80) (43.21) (43.85)
Constant 103.33 184.62 184.90 *** 187.90 149.63 148.58 ** 220.89 *** 300.06 ***
(97.46) (112.33) (37.72) (58.36) (152.61) (60.27) (66.99) (47.63)
Age (3.78) **
1.89
Age Squared 0.01
(0.02)
Observations 840 373 598 939 871 852 691 6,130
R-squared 0.209 0.138 0.100 0.122 0.136 0.245 0.113 0.123
Note: * denotes P < 0.1, **  denotes P < 0.5, ** denotes P < 0.01, effect of binary variables and constant reported in thousands, robust standard errors in parenthesis
Table 3: OLS Regression Results - Cash Demanded for Cases Settled Within 3 Years (Thousands)
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Age Group After Policy Change
0 to 2 2.450***
(0.213)
3 to 19 2.253***
(0.284)
20 to 29 1.971***
(0.244)
30 to 39 1.994***
(0.192)
40 to 49 2.051***
(0.199)
50  to  59 1.902***
(0.169)
60  to  69 1.777***
(0.196)
All  Ages 2.006***
(0.072)
Table 4: Duration Results - Cox Proportional Hazard, 
Cases Settled Within 3 Years
Hazard Ratio
Note: * denotes P < 0.1, **  denotes P < 0.5, ** denotes P < 0.01, other regression 
coef f ecients supressed (available upon request), Cash Demanded does not statistically 
inf luence duration
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Age group
Average 
Settlement Pre-
Reform
Estimated Effect of 
Reform on 
Settlement Amount
Estimated Effect 
of Reform via 
Cash Demanded
Pre-Reform 
Average Time to 
Payment (Days)
Estimated Change 
in Time to 
Payment (Days)
Difference in 
Settlement's 
Asset Value
Percent of 
Original 
Value Lost
0 to 2 784.29 0.00 -144.81 832.18 -492.51 -132.61 16.91
3 to 19 436.84 0.00 0.00 818.47 -455.19 7.69 -1.76
20 to 29 409.37 -111.11 0.00 840.21 -413.92 -106.34 25.98
30 to 39 469.34 -103.40 -175.22 844.61 -421.03 -275.52 58.70
40 to 49 532.87 0.00 -208.47 843.21 -432.09 -203.05 38.10
50 to 59 433.06 0.00 -65.65 854.88 -405.42 -59.89 13.83
60 to 69 381.37 0.00 -131.46 836.17 -365.62 -127.93 33.54
All Ages 471.64 -59.10 -118.23 837.81 -420.16 -172.54 36.58
Table 5: Effect of Reform on Quick Settlements, Cases Settled Within 3 Years (All Dollar Values in Thousands)
Note: All dollar values are scaled to year 2000 dollars, calculations assume a real interest rate of  0.0141.  Estimated ef f ect amounts generated using Tables 2, 3, and 4, statistically insignif icant results reported as zeroes. Estimated 
ef f ect on settlement amount is the af ter policyef f ect f rom Table 2.  Estimated ef f ect via Cash Demanded is the ef f ect of  Cash Demanded f rom Table 2 multiplied by the af ter policy ef f ect f rom Table 3.  Estimated change in time to 
payment is the inverse of  the hazard f rom Table 4 multiplied by average pre-reform time to payment.
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Age Group MEQ
0 to 2 62
3 to 19 62
20 to 29 45
30 to 39 35
40 to 49 43
50 to 59 52
60 to 69 49
All Ages 43
Table 6: Maximum Entropy Quantiles
Age group OLS Median MEQ
0 to 2 16.91 5.76 5.34
3 to 19 -1.76 23.08 26.96
20 to 29 25.98 29.14 25.73
30 to 39 58.70 27.59 22.34
40 to 49 38.10 35.69 26.79
50 to 59 13.83 30.29 28.73
60 to 69 33.54 25.37 23.47
All Ages 36.58 29.76 22.94
Table 7: Effect of Reform on Asset Value,                                              
Cases Settled Within 3 Years
Percent of Asset Value Lost
Note: All dollar values are scaled to year 2000 dollars, calculations assume a real interest rate of  0.0141.  
OLS results taken f rom Table 5.  Median and MEQ columns replicate Table 5 using median or MEQ 
settlement amounts and Median or MEQ regression.
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Age Group 3.5 Years 3 years
After Policy Change (Binary) -68.11 *** -59.10 ***
(14.19) (16.15)
Cash Demanded (Thousands) 0.58 *** 0.61 ***
(0.04) (0.06)
Initial Indemnity Reserve (Thousands) 0.35 ** 0.46 ***
(0.14) (0.12)
Per Accident Policy Limit (Thousands) 0.02 * 0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
Other Physicians Defending (Binary) 57.85 *** 72.85 ***
(10.40) (13.87)
Other Health Care Providers Defending (Binary) 39.34 *** 39.21 **
(12.22) (16.93)
Constant 164.07 *** 175.75 ***
(31.68) (42.88)
Age -4.30 *** -5.63 ***
(1.18) (1.53)
Age Squared 0.03 ** 0.04 ***
(0.01) (0.01)
Observations 9120 6,130
R-squared 0.549 0.575
Table 8: OLS Regression Results - Settlement Amount (Thousands) - 
Maximum Time to Settlement Sensitivity
Note: * denotes P < 0.1, **  denotes P < 0.5, ** denotes P < 0.01, effect of binary variables and 
constant reported in thousands, robust standard errors in parenthesis
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Age Group 3.5 Years 3 years
After Policy Change (Binary) -204.98 *** -193.82 ***
(43.81) (27.29)
Initial Indemnity Reserve (Thousands) 2.43 *** 1.97 ***
(0.39) (0.34)
Per Accident Policy Limit (Thousands) 0.05 *** 0.04 **
(0.01) (0.01)
Other Physicians Defending (Binary) 137.72 *** 162.49 ***
(18.00) (20.78)
Other Health Care Providers Defending (Binary) 67.93 ** 113.07 **
(29.01) (43.85)
Constant 285.95 *** 300.06 ***
(43.81) (47.63)
Age -4.32 *** -3.78 **
(1.56) 1.89
Age Squared 0.02 0.01
(0.02) (0.02)
Observations 9120 6,130
R-squared 0.153 0.123
Table 9: OLS Regression Results - Cash Demanded (Thousands) - 
Maximum Time to Settlement Sensitivity
Note: * denotes P < 0.1, **  denotes P < 0.5, ** denotes P < 0.01, effect of binary variables and 
constant reported in thousands, robust standard errors in parenthesis
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Appendix: Asset Value Calculations 
 
Asset	  Value	  (Table	  5)	  generation	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
Table	  5,	  Column	  2	  –	  
Average	  of	  Settlements	  
within	  3	  years	  for	  given	  
age	  group	  
Table	  5,	  Column	  3	  –	  
Estimated	  policy	  effect	  
from	  Table	  2,	  set	  equal	  
to	  zero	  if	  not	  significant	  
Table	  5,	  Column	  4	  –	  
Estimated	  policy	  effect	  
from	  Table	  3,	  set	  equal	  
to	  zero	  if	  insignificant,	  
multiplied	  by	  estimated	  
effect	  of	  cash	  demanded	  
in	  Table	  3	  
Table	  5,	  Column	  5	  –	  
Average	  duration	  of	  case	  
in	  pre-­‐policy	  period	  
Table	  5,	  Column	  6	  –	  
Column	  4	  multiplied	  by	  
estimate	  from	  Table	  4	  
( 2 + 3 + 4)
1.0141( )
	  
Table	  5,	  Column	  7	  –	  Sum	  
of	  columns	  2,	  3	  and	  4,	  
adjusted	  for	  change	  in	  
timing	  of	  payment	  in	  
Table	  6	  
Table	  5,	  Column	  8	  –	  
divide	  column	  7	  by	  
column	  1.	  Multiply	  by	  
negative	  1	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Alternate	  Asset	  Value	  (Table	  7)	  generation	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
 
Table	  7,	  Column	  1	  –	  Same	  as	  
Table	  5,	  Column	  8	  
Table	  7,	  Column	  2	  –	  Uses	  median	  techniques,	  generated	  
using	  same	  logic	  as	  Table	  5,	  the	  differences	  are:	  
 Column	  2	  of	  Table	  5	  uses	  the	  median	  settlement	  amount	  
 Columns	  3	  and	  4	  of	  Table	  5	  come	  from	  median	  
	  
Table	  7,	  Column	  2	  –	  Uses	  MEQ	  techniques,	  generated	  using	  
same	  logic	  as	  Table	  5,	  the	  differences	  are:	  
 Column	  2	  of	  Table	  5	  uses	  the	  MEQ	  settlement	  amount	  
 Columns	  3	  and	  4	  of	  Table	  5	  come	  from	  MEQ	  regressions	  
(MEQ’s	  vary	  based	  on	  age	  group)	  
